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Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish

that Mr. Powell possessed a dangerous weapon.

When reviewing a

sufficiency-of-evidence challenge from a criminal bench trial,
the appellate court "must sustain the trial court's judgment
State

unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence.'"
v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) (quoting State
Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).

v.

Consequently, the

appellate court "will review the record to see if the clear
weight of the evidence, not including demeanor and credibility,

4

is contrary to the verdict."

Id.

at 787; see

also

State

v.

Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Preservation

of Issue

or Statement

of Grounds for

Review

Trial counsel preserved this issue by moving for a directed
verdict after the State rested in case (See R. 93 (5/19/99 Tr.
Trans.), pp. 34-36).

Additionally, trial counsel argued in

closing argument that the State had failed to establish
possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt (See id.

at

R. 93, pp. 71-73).
2.

Whether the sentencing judge plainly erred in the

course of sentencing Mr. Powell by violating Article 1, § 7, of
the Utah Constitution and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (a) .
The legal principles of plain error are set forth in State
Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) and State v.

Archambeau,
State

v.

v.

820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Wanosik,

Preservation

See

also

2001 UT App 241, Hf27-36, 31 P.3d 615.

of Issue

or Statement

of Grounds for

Review

The sentencing judge's errors are reviewable for plain
error or exceptional circumstances.

See State

1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v.

Archambeau,

922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Cf.

State

241, ff27-36.

5

v.

v.

Dunn,

850 P.2d

820 P.2d 920,

Wanosik,

2001 UT App

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case, as it is presently constituted, involves
essentially two questions.

First, was there sufficient evidence

at trial to convict Mr. Powell of possession of a firearm as a
restricted person?

Second, did the trial court commit plain

error by violating Mr. Powell's right to due process and Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) in the course of sentencing?
The State charged Mr. Powell with the Illegal Possession of
a Handgun, a third degree felony (Count 1 ) , Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (Count 2 ) , Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor (Count 3 ) , and
Improper Lane Operation, a class B misdemeanor (Count 4 ) . Mr.
Powell pleaded not guilty to all charges.
Mr. Powell appeared before the district court for a bench
trial.

After the State rested its case, Mr. Powell's trial

counsel moved for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 4 of the
Amended Information.

The trial court, upon the State's

6

stipulation, dismissed Count 4.

However, the trial court denied

the motion as to Count 1.
After trial, the court immediately convicted Mr. Powell of
Counts 1, 2, and 3.

The trial court subsequently sentenced Mr.

Powell in absentia to an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison for Count 1 and two terms of six
months on Counts 2 and 3, to run concurrently with each other
and with the term imposed for Count 1.

Although the Sentence,

Judgment, and Commitment was signed by the court on October 19,
2000, it is reflected as having been entered on October 17,
2000.
Mr. Powell filed a pro se Notice of Intent to Appeal and
Request of Appointment of Counsel for Appeal on November 13,
2000.

In addition, Mr. Powell, through appointed appellate

counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on November 15, 2000.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

During rush-hour traffic on December 17, 1998, Mr.

Powell, in the course of attempting to change lanes, was
involved in an automobile accident that involved numerous other
vehicles (R. 26-28, Amended Information; R. 93 (3/19/99 Tr.
Trans.), p. 24, lines 12-13).

7

2.

At the time, Mr. Powell lived with Ms. Shannon Lee

Stewart in Wyoming (R. 93 (3/19/99 Tr. Trans.), p. 39).
3.

Mr. Powell had traveled from their residence in

Wyoming to Utah so that Mr. Powell could be with Ms. Stewart,
who at the time was staying with family while she worked in
Centerville, Utah {Id.
4.

at R. 93, pp. 38-39).

Earlier that day, Mr. Powell and Ms. Stewart had been

"running errands" in their car {Id.

at R. 93, pp. 41, 51, 60,

and 3 9).
5.

Approximately mid-morning, while running errands, Mr.

Powell and Ms. Stewart had an argument, after which Ms. Stewart
abruptly got out of the vehicle and Mr. Powell drove away in the
car - mad {Id.

at R. 93, pp. 51, 41-42, and 52).

In so doing,

Ms. Stewart inadvertently left her back pack in the vehicle

{Id.

at R. 93, pp. 40-41).
6.

That day Ms. Stewart's back pack contained a separate

fanny pack, which, in turn, contained her gun {Id.

at R. 93, p.

40-41) . Ms. Stewart owned the gun prior to her relationship
with Mr. Powell {Id.
7.

at R. 93, p. 46).

Ms. Stewart had placed the back pack in the car

earlier that day prior to running errands {Id.
51) .

8

at R. 93, pp. 16,

8.

After driving off mad, Mr. Powell went to work (Id.

at

R. 93, p. 61). In the course of returning from work, Mr. Powell
was involved in the previously mentioned accident
9.

{Id.).

After the officers began investigating the accident,

the odor of burnt Marijuana allegedly emanated from the vehicle
driven by Mr. Powell {Id.
10.

at R. 93, p. 6).

Officer Anderson, Utah Highway Patrol, subsequently

searched the vehicle and found what he believed to be drug
paraphernalia (Id.

at R. 93, p. 8). He also allegedly found a

pipe on the roadside some distance from the vehicle, which
contained marijuana residue (Id.
11.

at R. 93, p. 11).

In the process of the search, Officer Anderson

searched a back pack that he found on the passenger seat (Id.

at

R. 93, p. 12). Inside the back pack, Officer Douglas found a
zippered fanny pack, which contained a nine-millimeter handgun
and clips
12.

(Id.).
The back pack, fanny pack, and the handgun were owned

by Ms. Stewart, who lived with Mr. Powell at the time in Wyoming
(Id.

at R. 93, pp. 38-43).
13.

Mr. Powell was subsequently charged with the Illegal

Possession of a Handgun, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3) (a) (Count 1), Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
9

Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Count 2 ) , Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)

(Count 3 ) , and Improper Lane Operation, a

class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(2)
(Count 4) (See R. 2 6-28, Amended Information).
14.

Mr. Powell pleaded not guilty to all charges (R. 91

(2/16/99 Arr. Trans.), p. 2 ) .
15.

After the State rested its case, Mr. Powell's trial

counsel moved for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 4 of the
Amended Information, arguing that the State presented no
evidence to support either the alleged improper lane change or
that Mr. Powell possessed Ms. Stewart's firearm (R. 93 (5/19/99
Tr. Trans.), pp. 34-36).

The trial court, upon the State's

stipulation, dismissed Count 4 - the improper lane change charge
(Id.

at R. 93, p. 34). However, the trial court denied the

motion as to Count 1 - the illegal possession of a handgun
charge (Id.
16.

at R. 93, p. 37.
After trial, the court immediately convicted Mr.

Powell of Counts 1, 2, and 3 (R. 93 (3/19/99 Tr. Trans.)), p.
77) .
17.

The trial court subsequently sentenced Mr. Powell in

absentia to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison for Count 1 and two terms of six months on
10

Counts 2 and 3, to run concurrently with each other and with the
term imposed for Count 1 (R. 61-62, Sentence, Judgment, and
Commitment).

Although the Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment

was signed by the court on October 19, 2000, it is reflected as
having been entered on October 17, 2000 {Id.) .
18.

On November 13, 2000, Mr. Powell filed a pro se Notice

of Intent to Appeal and Request of Appointment of Counsel for
Appeal (R. 66-67).
19.

Additionally, Mr. Powell, through appointed appellate

counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on November 15, 2000 (R. 71-74,
Notice of Appeal).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

To establish possession, the State must present

evidence at trial to show that the defendant exercised dominion
and control over the weapon, with knowledge of its presence.
The evidence presented by the State at trial, as demonstrated by
the previously marshaled evidence, shows that Mr. Powell did not
u

'exercise[ ] dominion or control" over the firearm "with

knowledge of its presence.7"

State

v. Banks,

1384 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Bankhead,
139, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1973)).

72 0 P.2d 1380,
30 Utah 2d 135,

The marshaled evidence

demonstrates that the State failed to present evidence that Mr.

11

Powell knew the firearm was in the car, let alone in the back
pack owned by Ms. Stewart.

Moreover, the State presented no

evidence that Mr. Powell exercised any control over the firearm.
2.

Rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court

to "afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to
show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before
imposing sentence.

Moreover, the due process clause of Article

1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.
Before imposing sentence, the court heard from neither
defense counsel nor the prosecutor concerning any information in
mitigation of punishment or any other information material to
the imposition of sentence.

Further, the court made little, if

any, reference at the sentencing hearing to the Presentence
Investigation Report, which had been previously prepared for the
very purpose of sentencing.
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor
the opportunity of presenting information material to the
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error.
Based on the plain and clear language of Article 1, § 7, of the
Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the errors committed by
12

the sentencing judge was obvious.

Finally, the sentencing

judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell inasmuch as both
he, through counsel, and the prosecutor were precluded from
presenting information prior to sentencing, which is a critical
stage of the criminal proceedings.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL TO ESTABLISH THAT MR. POWELL POSSESSED A
DANGEROUS WEAPON.
A.

Sufficiency-of-Evidence Challenge.

When confronted with a sufficiency-of-evidence challenge
from a criminal bench trial, the appellate court "must sustain
the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear
weight of the evidence.'"

State

v.

(Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker,
1987)).

Goodman,

763 P.2d 786, 786

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

Consequently, the appellate court "will review the

record to see if the clear weight of the evidence, not including
demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the verdict."
787; see also

State

v.

Gurr,

Id.

at

904 P.2d 238, 241, 242 (Utah Ct.

App. 1995).
A conviction will be upheld only if it is "xsupported by a
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as
charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of

13

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

Spanish

Fork

City

v.

Bryan,

1999 UT App 61, f5, 975 P.2d 501 (alternation in original)
(quoting State v.

Murphy,

617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980)).

Further, a guilty verdict is invalid if based exclusively " x on
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt.'"

Id.

(quoting State

v.

Workman,

852

P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)).
B.

Marshaling Requirement.

The appellate court will not address a challenge of a
finding of fact unless the appellant properly marshals the
evidence.
556.

See State

v.

Benvenuto,

1999 UT 60, fl3, 983 P.2d

To properly marshal the evidence, the appellant must

"marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's decision and
demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient to support the
court's findings of fact . . . ."

Id.

In Utah, a person previously convicted of a crime of
violence or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug is
prohibited from possessing a dangerous weapon.
Ann. § 76-10-503 (1) (a) .

See Utah Code

To establish possession, the State must

present evidence at trial to show that the defendant M* exercised
dominion and control' over the weapon, "with knowledge of its
presence.'"

State v.

Banks,

720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986)

14

(quoting State

v.

Bankhead,

30 Utah 2d 135, 139, 514 P.2d 800,

803 (1973)).
C.

Marshaling of Evidence that Supports the Trial
Court's Finding.

In the instant case, the trial court made the following
findings concerning the charge of illegal possession of a
handgun:
The Court would find that the back pack
was on the passenger seat sitting upright,
immediately adjacent to [Defendant] and the
Court finds that it is not logical that it
would land in that position as a result of
the collision.
Therefore, the Court finds that it was
accessible to him and under his control.
The Court finds the fact that he argued with
the officer about whether or not a chamber
had been, a bullet had been chambered,
indicates direct knowledge of the defendant
about the weapon, and therefore the Court
would find that he was in possession of the
weapon at the time alleged, that he was a
user of controlled substance, not only as a
result of the finding of the marijuana and
the paraphernalia in the vehicle and in
close proximity to him, but from his own,
but from his own acknowledgment.
Therefore, the Court finds the
defendant guilty of the illegal possession
of a handgun, possession of drug
paraphernalia and possession of marijuana.
See R. 93 (5/19/99 Tr. Trans.), pp. 76-77.
The following list constitutes the evidence supporting the
trial court's finding or determination that Mr. Powell illegally

15

possessed the firearm found in a fanny pack that, in turn, was
found in a separate back pack located in the vehicle:
1)

Mr. Powell apparently did not want Officer Anderson in
the car when moving the vehicle out of traffic.
id.

2)

See

at R. 93, p. 5;

After the collision, the back pack in which the
firearm was found was located on the front passenger
seat adjacent to Mr. Powell.

3)

See id.

at R. 93, p. 10;

After finding the firearm in the back pack, Officer
Anderson argued with Mr. Powell about whether or not a
bullet had been chambered in the firearm.

See id.

at

R. 93, p. 15;
4)

Mr. Powell knew that there was a loaded magazine in
the firearm.

5)

id.;

Mr. Powell stated that Ms. Stewart "had put the gun in
the car."

6)

See

See id.

at R. 93, p. 16;

Mr. Powell knew that Ms. Stewart owned and carried a
gun and that she would not keep a gun loaded with a
bullet chambered.

7)

See id.

at R. 93, pp. 44-45;

Even though the vehicle in which the firearm was found
was shared by Mr. Powell and Ms. Stewart, it had been
registered in Mr. Powell's name.
pp. 4 8; and
16

See id.

at R. 93,

8)

Mr. Powell knew that Ms. Stewart "often" carried the
firearm in her back pack.
D.

See id.

at R. 93, p. 65.

The Marshaled Evidence is Insufficient to Support
the Trial Court's Finding that Mr. Powell
Knowingly Possessed the Firearm.

The evidence presented by the State at trial, as
demonstrated by the previously marshaled evidence, shows that
Mr. Powell did not "'exercise[ ] dominion or control" over the
State

firearm "with knowledge of its presence.'"

v.

P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Bankhead,
2d 135, 139, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1973)).

Banks,

720

30 Utah

There was no

evidence presented that Mr. Powell knew the firearm was in the
car, let alone in the back pack owned by Ms. Stewart.

Moreover,

the State presented no evidence that Mr. Powell exercised any
control over the firearm.
Mr. Powell's knowledge about whether or not a bullet had
been chambered in the firearm does not equate to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that he exercised dominion or control with
knowledge of its presence in the vehicle.

Direct knowledge by

Mr. Powell of Ms. Stewart's practices concerning the gun simply
do not constitute knowledge that the firearm was present in Ms.
Stewart's back pack that she abruptly left in the vehicle
earlier that day.

17

The State presented no evidence that Mr. Powell, rather
than Ms. Stewart, who undisputably owned not only the gun, but
the back pack, and the fanny pack in which the gun was kept,
possessed or controlled the firearm.

Further, it is wholly

irrational to conclude that the mere presence of the gun in the
vehicle meant that Mr. Powell, rather that Ms. Stewart, who
admittedly had equal access to the car and who admittedly left
the back pack in the car earlier that day after an argument with
Mr. Powell, possessed or controlled it.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. POWELL'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND UTAH RULE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(a) IN THE COURSE OF
SENTENCING MR. POWELL.

The second paragraph of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
22(a) states:
Before imposing sentence the court
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to
make a statement and to present any
information in mitigation of punishment, or
to show any legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney
shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the
imposition of sentence.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).

Because Mr. Powell was involuntarily

absent and unable to personally attend his sentencing, he did
not waive the right to make a statement at sentencing or present
information in mitigation of punishment or to show legal cause
18

Cf.

why sentence should not be imposed.
P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1996); see also

State

State

v.

v.

Anderson,

Casarez,

929

656 P.2d

1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (holding that "[s]entencing is a critical
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled
to the effective assistance of counsel").
Rule 22 (a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court to
"afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show
any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before
imposing sentence.
u

See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).

Moreover,

[t]he due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah

Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in
fixing a sentence."
1985); see also

State

State
v.

v. Howell,
McClendon,

707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah
611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah

1980) (discussing consideration of defendant's background and
crime committed for sentence to be appropriate and to serve the
interests of society); State

v. Lipsky,

608 P.2d 1241, 1249

(Utah 1980) (requiring disclosure of presentence report to
defendant prior to sentencing).
At sentencing in this case, the sentencing judge recognized
that Mr. Powell was involuntarily absent.
Sentencing Transcript), p. 1; see
19

also

See R. 94 (10/17/00

R. 59-60, Consent to

Sentencing in Absentia.

After briefly discussing Mr. Powell's

involuntary absence and the consent to sentencing in

absentia,

the sentencing judge then proceeded to impose sentence.
94 (10/17/00 Sentencing Transcript), pp. 1-3.

See R.

Before imposing

sentence, the court heard from neither defense counsel nor the
prosecutor concerning "any information in mitigation of
punishment" or "any [other] information material to the
imposition of sentence."

See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).

Further,

the trial court made little, if any, reference during the
sentencing hearing to the Presentence Investigation Report,
which had been previously prepared for the very purpose of
sentencing.

See R. 73-94, Presentence Investigation Report.1

By not providing the prosecutor the opportunity to present
information material to sentencing, the sentencing judge
precluded Mr. Powell and prosecutor from making any
recommendation or arguments concerning Mr. Powell's sentence.
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor
the opportunity of presenting information material to the
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error.

*The Presentence Investigation Report is part of the record
of the related case involving Mr. Powell that is currently before
this Court in State v. Powell, Case No. 20001054-CA. The trial
court sentenced Mr. Powell in absentia
on both cases at the same
sentencing hearing on October 17, 2000. See R. 94 (10/17/00
Sentencing Transcript).
20

To prevail on a claim of plain error, a defendant must show u(i)
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.

State

v. Dunn, 850

P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Based on the plain and clear language of Rule 22(a),
Article 1, § 7, of the Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the
errors committed by the sentencing judge were obvious.
State

v.

Wanosik,

Cf.

2001 UT App 241, ^27-36, 31 P.3d 615.

Finally, the sentencing judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr.
Powell inasmuch as both he, through counsel, and the prosecutor
were precluded from presenting information prior to sentencing,
which is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Powell respectfully requests
that this Court vacate both the conviction of Illegal Possession
of a Handgun and the invalid Sentencing, which violated due
process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (a), and that the
Court remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
the instructions in its Opinion, and for such other relief as

21

the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances of
this case,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 0th day of February, 2 0 02
WIGGINS, P.C.

Scott
Attorney
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Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
following on the 20th day of February, 2002:
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
P.O. Box 140854
160 East 3 00 South^-fi^h Floor
Salt Lake City^-I^V 84^4-0854
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ADDENDA
Addendum A:
Addendum B:

Amended Information
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment

24

Tab A
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MELVINC WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P 0 Box 618
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone (801)451-4300
Fax
(801)451-4328

to 8

//
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs
DANIEL B POWELL,
DOB 11/25/1966,
Defendant

Bail
AMENDED INFORMATION
Case No 991700002
OTN

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, on
or about December 17, 1998, at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of
COUNT 1
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A HANDGUN (76-10-503(3)(a) UCA), a felony of the
thud degree, as follows That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant who is an unlawful user
of controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37-2 UCA, was in possession of a handgun

COUNT 2
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, (58-37a-5(l)), a class B
misdemeanor, as follows That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did knowingly,
intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate,
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,

pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body.
COUNT 3
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA), a class B
misdemeanor, as follows" That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did knowingly and
intentionally possess or use a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana.
COUNT 4
IMPROPER LANE OPERATION, (41-6-61(2)), a class B misdemeanor, as follows:
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did operate and travel in the center-lane of a three
lane roadway in direct violation of official traffic-control devices, to wit: either failing to pass another
vehicle safely in said center-lane or, attempting to make or execute an improper left turn in said
center-lane.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: Douglas
Anderson.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT' The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy Davis
County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Douglas Anderson of
the Utah Highway Patrol, and the Information herein is based upon such personal observations and
investigation of said officer.
On December 17, 1998, defendant was involved in an accident where he made an
improper lane change. During the investigation, officers noticed an odor of marijuana coming from
defendant

He admitted using marijuana in the past two days. During a search of defendant's

belongings, a handgun was located. A pipe with marijuana residue and rolling papers were also
found.

y\

Authorized March 3, 1999,
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney

Deputy Davis County Attorney
Presented and filed this 3

day of

May

<A
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Clerk

A felony of the third degree carries a possible maximum penalty of up to five years imprisonment
and/or up to $5,000 fine.

TabB

2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991700002 FS

DANIEL B POWELL,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

RODNEY S. PAGE
October 17, 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
glendap
Prosecutor: WEST, JUDITH
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): CELLA, GLEN T
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 25, 1966
Video
Tape Number:
10/17/00
Tape Count: 2.30
CHARGES
1. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/19/1999 Guilty
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/19/1999 Guilty
3. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/19/1999 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

Case No: 991700002
Date:
Oct 17, 2000

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The prison sentence is to run concurrent with the jail sentences.
This is run concurrent with the federal sentence and to be served
in the federal prison.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 6 month(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 6 month(s)
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The jail sentences are to run concurrent with each other and with
the prison sentence. These are to run concurrent with the federal
sentence and to be served in the federal prison.
Consent to Sentencing in Absentia is filed. Defendant is serving
sentence in a federal prison in Pennsylvania.
Dated this

ft^day

of Q d h

, 20^£>_.

RODNEY Sf. PAGE
~
District Court Judge
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